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Casenote
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CoN SUmONALITY OF BLOOD TEST PER-
FORMED OVER OBJECTION OF INTOXICATED DpjvER-Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down the decision in the case of Schmerber v. California.1 The
case involved a criminal conviction for driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.2 While at the hospital
undergoing treatment for injuries resulting from the accident, de-
fendant was arrested by a police officer, and under the direction of
the officer, a physician at the hospital drew a blood sample from
the body of the defendant. The result of the blood analysis, which
indicated that the petitioner was intoxicated, was admitted in evi-
dence at the trial over the objection of the petitioner.
The petitioner objected to the admission of the blood test on
the following grounds: first, that he was denied due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States;3 second, that his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had been violated; third, that his fourth amend-
ment right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated; and fourth, that his right to coun-
sel under the sixth amendment had, in effect, been ignored. The
petitioner alleged that these rights, the latter three made applic-
able to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,4 had been violated after his refusal, on the advice
of counsel, to give his consent to the blood test.
Not since 1956 in Breithaupt v. Abrams5 had the Supreme
1 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
2 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23102(a) (West 1960). "It is unlawful for any
person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or under the
combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any drug, to drive a
vehicle upon any highway."
8 The fourteenth amendment in applicable part provides that "No State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 As to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination made
applicable to the states see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); as to
the fourth amendment right not to be subject to unreasonable searches
and seizures see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); as to the sixth
amendment right to counsel see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Petitioner was unconscious when the blood test
was taken.
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Court decided the constitutionality of the blood test, or the admis-
sibility of the results of such a test into evidence.
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM
In Breithaupt the facts, with the exception of the defendant's
lack of consciousness, and the issues before the Court were essen-
tially the same as those presented in Schmerber. The Court in
Breithaupt, since the exclusionary rule had not been adopted by
New Mexico, disposed of petitioner's contentions, with the exception
of his due process of law argument under the fourteenth amend-
ment, on the basis of two prior decisions.6 Petitioner in Breithaupt
tried, also unsuccessfully, to fit his fourteenth amendment due
process claim under the rule set forth in Rochin v. California.7
In Rochin the Court had said that such acts by agents of the
government in an effort to obtain evidence were bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities; that such conduct "shocked the con-
science" and was so "brutal" and "offensive" that it did not com-
port with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.8 The Breit-
haupt Court refused to hold that the case came under the rule
enunciated in Rochin, stating that an involuntary blood test did not
violate due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The
Court in Breithaupt said that the test, administered by a physi-
cian, was not such "conduct that shocks the conscience," and that
such a method of obtaining evidence did not offend a "sense of
justice."9
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in the same case,10 stated that
the problem was one of two component parts, the character of the
bodily invasion and the expression of the victim's will. After dis-
cussing the similarities of the facts in Rochin and Breithaupt, he
stated that the distinction between the two cases was merely the
6 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Wolf disposed of petitioner's
fourth amendment claim. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Twining disposed of petitioner's fifth amendment claim.
7 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin the police, having "some information"
that petitioner was selling drugs, entered petitioner's bedroom; peti-
tioner put two capsules in his mouth, a struggle followed but the police
failed to retrieve the capsules so they took petitioner to a hospital
where a stomach pump administered by a doctor produced the capsules.
The same set of facts today would assuredly be held to violate the
fourth amendment as well, thereby giving the Court the opportunity
to avoid the due process of law question under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
s Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).
9 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1957).
10 Id. at 440.
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arbitrary one of personal reaction to a stomach pump rather than a
blood test. In Schmerber the Court disposed of petitioner's four-
teenth amendment due process of law claim on the basis of their
holding in Breithaupt, stating that nothing existed in the former to
persuade them to overrule that part of Breithaupt.11 Yet the
Schmerber Court, by using the "offend a sense of justice" test and
thus impliedly the "shock the conscience" test, has re-affirmed a
viewpoint espoused by earlier court decisions' 2 without meeting
head on the contention of Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting
opinion in Breithaupt:
[D]ue process means at least that law enforcement officers in
their efforts to obtain evidence from persons suspected of a crime
must stop short of bruising the body, breaking the skin, punctur-
ing tissue or extracting body fluids, whether they contemplate
doing it by force or by stealth.13
MI. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Justice Brennan, author of the majority opinion 14 in Schmerber
v. California, began his discussion of the fifth amendment (after
giving procedural background on that particular issue) by citing
Miranda v. Arizona, a case decided by the Court one week before
Schmerber. The passage from Miranda follows:
All of these policies point to one overriding thought: the consti-
tutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and in-
tegrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual bal-
ance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load,"...
to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusa-
tory system of criminal justice demands that the government seek-
ing to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by
its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple ex-
pedient of compelling it from his own mouth.'5
11 The majority in Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 760 n.4 (1966), adopted part
of the viewpoint of Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion in
Breithaupt; in effect the majority said that no reason existed to dis-
tinguish between force, as in Schmerber, and stealth, as in Breithaupt.
12 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
'3 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957). In Schmerber all of the
dissenting justices support this view.
14 It should be noted that while the decision in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), was 5-4, two of the Justices, Harlan and Stewart,
in a short concurring opinion, said that while they agreed with the
Court that the taking of a blood test involved no testimonial compul-
sion, they thought that the Court should go further and hold that "apart
from this consideration the case in no way implicates the fifth amend-
ment." Id. at 772.
15 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
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The Court then goes on to concede two points: one, that a blood
test fails to "respect the inviolability of the human personality"'16
and two, since the state is able to rely on evidence forced from an
accused it violates the standard that the state must obtain evidence
"by its own independent labors.'17 The Court continues by stat-
ing that according to history and legal precedent the privilege
has never been given the full scope of the values it helps to protect
and is limited to such situations,
in which the State seeks to submerge these values by obtaining
the evidence against an accused through "the cruel, simple expe-
dient of compelling it from his own mouth. . . ." In sum, the
privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right
"to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will."18
Thus it appears that the fifth amendment privilege is limited, at
least in most circumstances, to words from the mouth and it ap-
pears that at this point in the decision the Court is adopting the
viewpoint of Professor Wigmore as announced in his voluminous
writings; in fact, Professor Wigmore has used similar words to
express his position.19 The Court, however, expressly stated that
Schmerber was not to be taken as an adoption of Wigmore's view-
point.20  In addition to this specific statement the Court went on
to say that "the privilege reaches an accused's communications,
whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses
which are also communications .... 21
16 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
17 Ibid.
18 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 (1966), and quoting in part
from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). Accord, Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910), which the Court in Schmer-
ber cited as the leading case in this area. In Holt petitioner had been
convicted of first degree murder and objected to the admission into
evidence by an attesting witness that a blouse which petitioner had
been required to try on fitted him. Justice Holmes called it an exten-
sion of the fifth amendment and said that the "objection in principle
would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with
a photograph in proof."
19 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961). "It was directed
at the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own
lips an admission of guilt, which would thus take the place of other
evidence."
20 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 n.7 (1966).
21 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966). The Court relies
on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for its position. Boyd
protected papers that the petitioner was ordered to produce under a
subpoena. Boyd will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
On the other hand, as the Court in Schmerber states, both state and
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The Court in Schmerber distinguishes, at least for the pur-
poses of this case, between evidence that is "communication" or
"testimony"-these the privilege protects-and evidence, not pro-
tected by the privilege, that makes the accused the source of "real
or physical evidence. '22
The Court is evidently using the word "testimony" in the
same sense that it was used by Wigmore,23 and as to what are
"communications" the Court has the example of Boyd.24 However,
at least three members of the majority envision the privilege as
meaning something more than, or different from, Wigmore or Boyd,
for the Court goes on to state that to use a lie detector to estab-
lish guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses,
whether such responses are willed or not, is contrary to the spirit
and history of the fifth amendment.25
Finally, the Court concludes that the petitioner's testimonial
capacities or communications were in no way implicated because
the petitioner was merely a donor, thus suggesting that a legal
distinction exists between the cases where an accused actively par-
ticipates while evidence is compelled from him, and the cases where
the accused is only passively involved as the evidence is forced
from him.
B. WHE HAS Scm mnER TAKEN Us
To start, several concepts have been used in an effort to deter-
mine the meaning and scope of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. This article will start with the one men-
tioned specifically in Schmerber, that is, the position taken by Pro-
fessor Wigmore, which has been called the "traditional view,"26 and
will then continue with other views implicit in the language of the
Court in Schmerber. Professor Wigmore stated in effect that the
history and spirit of the struggle by which the privilege was estab-
federal courts have usually held that the privilege does not protect
against compulsion in finger printing, photography, or measurements,
to write or speak for identification, or to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. Contra, as
to alcoholic testing (urine and blood movements), Apodaca v State,
140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941); Trammell v. State, 162 Tex.
Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
22 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
23 See note 19, supra.
24 See note 21, supra.
25 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
26 Slough and Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal
Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 lmN. L. REV. 673, 686 (1960).
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lished led to the conclusion that the object of the protection is to
prevent the employment of the legal process to extract from the
accused's own mouth an admission of guilt, which will thus take the
place of other evidence.2 7  He goes on to say that it is not every
compulsion that violates the privilege, but only testimonial compul-
sion. Thus, under Professor Wigmore's view, testimony without
compulsion is not privileged and compulsion which is not directed
at extracting evidence from an accused's mouth is not within the
scope of the fifth amendment. The difficulty, in the Wigmore
view, is primarily with the word "compulsion. '28
As stated before, the Court apparently adopts the Wigmore
viewpoint, but the Court denies this, and the denial is supported
in fact 29 by their sustaining of the rule in Boyd v. United States.30
The so called Boyd Doctrine is the second approach to the fifth
amendment privilege, and is sought to be utilized in the dissent
of Mr. Justice Black. The Court in Boyd started its discussion
with what it considered the landmark case of Entick v. Carring-
ton.3 1 The action in Entick was for entering the plaintiff's dwelling
house and searching and examining his papers. That the Entick
rationale was based upon property concepts cannot be doubted;8 2
however, this is consistent with Schmerber.33 Mr. Justice Bradley,
author of the majority opinion, went on to say that:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-feited by his conviction of some public offense,--it is the invasion
of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence
of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening
boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forci-
ble and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
27 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940).
28 Miranda v. Arizona, 484 U.S. 436 (1966). Any attempt at defining the
word "compulsion" is beyond the scope of this article.
29 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 775 (1966). Justice Black, dis-
senting, says that as long as Boyd stands Wigmore has not been adopted
in full, and the majority in Schmerber concede that Boyd still stands.
30 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31 [1765] 2 K.B. 275. See 54 GEO. L. J. 593 (1966).
32 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 319 (1953). A comprehensive article that discusses
the rationale of Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), a deci-
sion which was based on Boyd.
33 Blood must surely be considered the property of the person in whom
it flows; it may be sold, donated, or, if one so chooses, wasted. How-
ever, the accused, in most cases, is more interested in not having the
test taken then he is in the possibility of losing his blood.
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private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or
to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other... It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its
mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitu-
tional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of pro-
cedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of the person and prop-
erty should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual deprecia-
tion of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in sub-
stance.3 4
The above quotation is the basis of what has been called the Boyd
Doctrine, a doctrine that has been both inundated with praise and
soundly condemned.3
5
Turning to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Schmerber one
finds that: one, the Court having re-affirmed Boyd has held that
a person's papers cannot be used to incriminate him but his blood
may be used to incriminate him-"a strange hierarchy of values";
two, that though blood is not "oral testimony," that is, blood is not
evidence extracted from one's mouth, it "communicates" most ef-
fectively to a jury; three, that the frailty of the distinction be-
tween the blood test and a lie detector test points up what Justice
Black considers the basic error in the Court's holding in Schmerber,
34 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 635 (1886). (Emphasis added.)
In Boyd thirty-five pieces of plate glass were seized from the
petitioners by the collector and forfeited to the United States under an
appropriation statute. The change was that the goods were imported
into the United States, subject to payment duties, and that the owners
or agents of the merchandise committed the alleged fraud. At the
trial it became important to establish the value of the plate glass, and
to do this the district judge, acting under the same statute, required
the petitioners to produce the invoice of the twenty-nine cases. The
petitioners obeyed, but objected to the validity and constitutionality of
the law on the ground that so far as it compelled production of evi-
dence to be used against the claimants was unconstitutional and void.
Under the statute the effect of not producing the invoice, or the
allegations stated in the motion, was that the failure or refusal was to
be taken as a confession unless explained to the satisfaction of the
court. If produced, then the result, as was the situation in Boyd,
might be admitted into evidence. The Court said that the alternatives
were tantamount to compelling their production.
s Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) "a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives
in the United States"; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 160 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662-63 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring). But see 8 WiGMORE, EvaNcy § 2264 (3d ed.
1940).
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that is, its failure to follow the doctrine set out in Boyd.3 6
Arguments as to whether or not Boyd should have been fol-
lowed will now turn upon words and phrases such as "testimony,"
"communications," and "liberal" as contrasted with a "close and
literal" construction of the Bill of Rights. It would seem that the
Court in Schmerber was faced with an excellent opportunity to
expound, elaborate, constrict, or nullify the rationale of Boyd;
however, the Court chose not to do so.
A third approach to the fifth amendment privilege is that
which Professor McCormick designates as a line drawn "between
enforced passivity on the part of the accused and enforced activity
on his part.137 Professor McCormick gives several citations which
36 In addition to Boyd, see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
Petitioner Gouled and two others were charged with conspiracy to
defraud the United States. The case involved two separate and ques-
tionable acts: one, a private in the Army attached to the intelligence
department, and an acquaintance of Gouled, under orders, went to
Gouled's office on a friendly visit and seized and carried away several
documents, one of which was of "evidentiary value" only, and this act
was held to violate the fourth amendment; two, the admission into evi-
dence of such paper against the same person, on the basis of Boyd, was
held to be a violation of the fifth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 454-58 (1962) (Brennan J., dissenting). The facts in Lopez
were as follows: a governmental agent suspected that the petitioner
was avoiding paying an excise tax on entertainment that petitioner was
providing in his club. The agent went to the club, talked to the peti-
tioner about the matter, and was offered a bribe by the petitioner.
After reporting the incident to his superiors, the agent went back
again, this time with a minifon, in an attempt to record essentially the
same thing that had transpired between the agent and petitioner on
the previous occasion. The evidence was obtained on the minifon and
such was used to convict petitioner of attempted bribery. Justice
Brennan said in effect that the Court in Boyd had rejected a narrow,
literal conception of "search and seizure" and instead had read the
fourth and fifth amendments together, creating a broad right to invio-
late personalty. He went on to say that the authority of the Boyd
decision had never been impeached. Its basic principle, that the fourth
and fifth amendment interact to create a comprehensive right of pri-
vacy, of individual freedom, had been repeatedly approved by the
Court. "Boyd stated that, when the object of a search is violative of
the fifth amendment, the search is unreasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment .... However, when the articles in which
the defendant has a proprietary interest are seized and used as evi-
dence, the accused is, in effect, being compelled to be a witness against
himself .... Certainly, in view of the premise under which the Boyd
Court was operating, it would be incongruous to limit the application
of the rule to private papers." 34 FoRnHAm L. REV. 746, 748 (1966).
37 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 126 (1954).
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have supported this position, but as he says, "it seems to have no
basis in history, practicality or justice. 8 For, as McCormick points
out, under this viewpoint fingerprints and blood tests would be
permissible, while the taking of a handwriting specimen or the re-
enactment of a crime are "activities" which would be prohibited by
the fifth amendment. If any rule is in search of a reason it must
surely be the distinction between "enforced passivity" and "en-
forced activity."
Yet some acceptance of this rule is indicated in Schmerber.
The Court in the concluding paragraph of its discussion of the
fifth amendment says: "Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in
no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as donor, was
irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical
analysis and on that alone."39 This passage, in reference to the
blood test, follows the paragraph in which the Court speaks of a
lie detector as contrary to the spirit and history of the fifth amend-
ment. The Court distinguishes the lie detector test from the blood
test, not on the basis of the comparative reliability of the two
tests, but because in the lie detector situation guilt or innocence
will be determined by physiological responses, whether such re-
sponses are willed or not. Evidently the distinction is based on the
theory that the nervous system reacts to the question, taking an
active part in the testing, and consequently it is enforced activity
on the part of the accused-thus testimony. When the guilt, or at
least the evidence, is riding, so to speak, on the bloodstream, it is
neither testimony nor communication because the accused is a do-
nor; when the guilt-or evidence-is riding on the nervous system
and is, in effect, thrown out of the system by the accused as he
reacts to the test, he is no longer a donor but he has by his reaction
become an active participant.
The distinction between the lie detector and the blood test is
most unsatisfactory. Certainly an accused has no power to control
the results of the test, but is this a valid inquiry for the purpose of
distinguishing a blood test from a lie detector test? Justice Black in
his dissent asks: "How can it reasonably be doubted that the blood
test evidence was not in all respects the actual equivalent of "testi-
mony" taken from petitioner when the result of the test was of-
fered as testimony, was considered by the jury as testimony, and
the jury's verdict of guilt rests in part on that testimony?140
The final approach to the fifth amendment to be discussed is
38 Id. at 265.
89 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
40 Id. at 778.
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that which has been called the Black-Douglas view.41 Both Justice
Black and Justice Douglas have said, though somewhat differently,
that words taken from the mouth, capsules from the stomach, blood
from the veins, or incriminating evidence taken from the accused by
a device of modern science, without consent, is proscribed by the
command of the fifth amendment.42 "They would extend the pro-
tection of the privilege even to passive submission." 43 Thus, the
police cannot compel an accused to give them the evidence neces-
sary to put them in jail.44 Finally, "all legal writers and jurists
agree that somewhere along the continuum compulsion becomes ob-
noxious; in Douglas' view this occurs at a point short of outright
physical coercion."45
It seems the trouble with this view is that "society must suffer,
regardless of the cost and regardless of the extent of compulsion"
and this approach, for the sake of policing the police may be more
than society is willing to accept.46 In addition, its foundation in
legal history and precedent is limited.
The Supreme Court in Schmerber has done little to clear up
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and per-
haps they are not likely to do so. It seems, however, that the rule
in Boyd, although after Schmerber more than ever relegated to the
position of a lofty principle lacking in practicality, should be urged
by the minority. In this age of more than one "contrivance of
modern science," 47 the notions of privacy on which the Boyd Doc-
trine is based 48 become ever more important. Professor Wigmore
has said that the privilege exists mainly to stimulate the prosecu-
tion to a full and fair search of the evidence and to deter them
41 Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Prob-
lems of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. REV. 673 (1960).
42 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175, 179 (1952) (Black, J., & Doug-
las, J., concurring).
43 See note 41, supra.
44 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 442 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45 Supra note 41 at 689.
46 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940). 'f the privilege creates
inviolability not only for his physical control over his own vocal utter-
ances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercised,
then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the author-
ity of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained
by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender
of the evidential articles . .. ."
47 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 20 U. CHm. L. REv. 319
(1953).
48 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
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from relying on the accused's testimony extracted by force of law,49
and if one traces the historical development back to the time of
John Lilburn,50 this may be accurate. However, since 1886, in
Boyd, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a
privacy element in the privilege and this element has been ap-
proved and seemingly affirmed as recently as June of 1966..1 The
Court in Miranda said in part and quoted52 in part the following
passage:
Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as
one which groped for the proper scope of governmental power
over the citizen. As a "noble principle often transcends its ori-
gins," the privilege has come rightly to be recognized in part as
an individual's substantive right, a "right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of
our democracy."53
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
No mention of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is present in the dissenting opin-
ions in Schmerber. The reason is quite obvious, for once the Court
had decided that the blood test was not "testimony" or "communi-
cations" it had by-passed the Boyd ruling, and of course none of
the other approaches to the fifth amendment discussed are appli-
cable to the fourth amendment. Much of the discussion concerning
the Boyd Doctrine in part three of this article is also applicable as
to the fourth amendment. To avoid redundancy it will not be re-
peated in this part of the article; however, that Boyd is applicable
to the fourth amendment cannot be doubted. It was, in fact, a main
basis of the decision of Boyd, regardless of the need for such basis at
the time of the decision.54 Little else is to be said as to the fourth
amendment rationale in Schmerber.
Consequently, only two questions need be discussed-whether
49 8 WIGmomE, Ev mnxC. § 2265 (3d ed. 1940).
50 8 WGMoRE, EviDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940). Reporting on John Lil-
burn's trial Wigmore says, in effect, that Lilburn did not object to
answering questions about the charges laid to him, but only when the
Star Chamber started asking questions about things that he had not
been charged with did he object. But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 459 (1966), quoting from HA.LFr. & DAvES, THE LEVFLLER
TRACTS 1647-53, 454 (1944).
51 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
62 United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 579, 581-82, rev'd 353 U.S.
391 (1957).
Ma iranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
54 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963).
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the police were justified in requiring the petitioner to submit to a
blood test, and whether the means and procedures respected stand-
ards of reasonableness. 5 The Court states that probable cause ex-
isted, and, on the facts of this case, that conclusion is not to be
disputed. Next the Court says that there is no unrestricted right
to go beyond the exterior of the body to search for and seize the
evidence or fruit of the crime; that "human dignity and privacy
... forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained."5 6 To this statement the Court adds
that in the absence of a "clear indication" that such evidence will
be found, the law officers must bear the risk that the evidence will
disappear unless an immediate search takes place. The meaning of
this is somewhat difficult to ascertain, unless the "clear indication"
is only another term for probable cause. Perhaps, however, the
Court requires, in the situation where the intrusion extends be-
yond the body's surface, that there be something more than prob-
able cause; this would seem to indicate that the authority for a
search and seizure is, in theory, a somewhat slippery element. In
other words, the arresting officer has probable cause, and in
addition he thinks he may have a clear indication that if he is able
to get a blood test immediately he will be able to find the desired
evidence; he is able to get the accused to a hospital as quickly as is
possible, but the evidence is found to be lacking. In this situation
his authority has evidently slipped away from him and he must
bear the burden of his risk.57 An additional problem is the Court's
55 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring),
states that until Ker the standard for the states in the search and
seizure area was the "more flexible concept of 'fundamental' fairness,
or rights 'basic to a free society' embraced in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment," rather than the federal requirement
of reasonableness. See also Ruffin, Intoxication Tests and the Bill of
Rights: A New Look, 2 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 1, 9 (1966).
56 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
57 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). "Search requires authority; authority to search is gained by
what may be found during search without authority. By this reason-
ing every illegal search and seizure may be validated if the police find
evidence of crime. The result can hardly be to discourage police vio-
lation of the constitutional protection." Id. at 167.
Although, in the blood test situation, the accused has the protec-
tion of the probable cause requirement, the Court is evidently re-
quiring more than probable cause before a blood sample may be taken
and as to this "clear indication" Frankfurter's reasoning is appropri-
ate. It must be admitted that the problem exists a good deal more in
theory than in practicality, for the Court itself goes on to say that if
probable cause exists it is unlikely that a blood test will not be rele-
vant and the test unsuccessful. The use of the language will probably
have the effect, once probable cause is established, of encouraging the
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use of the words "desired evidence," for no indication is given as
to whether the "desired evidence" is a sufficient percentage of al-
cohol in the blood to aid in conviction, or only a percentage of al-
cohol in the blood sufficient to indicate that the accused was in fact
drinking alcoholic beverages.
The next question presented and answered by the Court is
whether it is reasonable for an officer to draw inferences of prob-
able cause and the relevance of a blood test without going before a
magistrate, since search warrants are usually required for a dwell-
ing, absent an emergency, and no less is to be expected in a situation
where the body is concerned. The Court disposes of the question
on the basis of the "destruction of evidence" test.58 The rule is
explained in Preston as follows:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for ex-
ample by the need to seize weapons and other things which might
be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on
the accused's person or under his immediate control.59
It is doubtful that in a situation where a blood test is relevant a
magistrate will ever be necessary for the issuance of a warrant; if
the situation did arise it would be rare. The Court then concludes
by saying that the test is an everyday occurrence, and that it was
performed, in this case, in a reasonable manner.60
V. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CLAIM
The right to counsel now arises at what is called the "custodial
interrogation"'61 stage of the proceedings. The right to counsel at
policeman to have the blood test taken as quickly as possible, even in
a situation where it might be practical and appropriate to go before
a magistrate before the blood test is taken. Such situations, admittedly,
would be rare.
58 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
59 Id. at 367.
60 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Since the fourth amendment
is now applicable to the states, the due process claim under the four-
teenth amendment in this area may well be a dead end. In addition,
the problems created by blood tests in the automobile drinking situa-
tion, may perhaps be avoided by the state legislatures enacting into
law a bill that makes the test itself the subject of the crime; that is,
a refusal to take the test vountarily would be an interference with the
duties of a police officer.
61 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo spoke of the right to counsel arising at the
time the investigation had focused on the accused. Other factors were
considered in Escobedo, but these become irrelevant under the explan-
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the custodial stage protects the fifth amendment privilege;62 how-
ever, since a blood test is not within the scope of the fifth amend-
ment, nothing exists with regard to the test, in most situations, for
counsel to protect. As a result, counsel may be sought for other
reasons, that is, the accused still has his right to counsel at the
custodial stage, but as to the taking of the blood test, absent reli-
gious beliefs or physical fears, the presence or absence of counsel
is in most situations irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The due process of law argument under the fourteenth amend-
ment is now solidly predicated on the Breithaupt ruling and
Schmerber re-emphasizes that a blood test does not fit under the
ruling of Rochin. Apparently, though the Court failed to answer
the question directly, the contention of Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Fortas, that due process in the search for evidence requires
that the government stop short of violence upon the person of the
accused, has been put aside permanently.
As to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
the Court has held that blood taken from the accused is not self-
incriminatory. The Boyd Doctrine, stating that the fourth and fifth
amendments run almost into each other, and that the Bill of Rights
must be liberally construed, has been placed back upon the shelf
subject to being brought down again at a later date.
In regard to the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures it only need be said that Boyd, resting in
part on the fifth amendment is not applicable since neither "testi-
mony" nor "communication" is present. Probable cause must exist,
the blood test must be relevant, the officer must be faced with an
emergency, and the methods employed must be reasonable.
The sixth amendment right to counsel, resting on the existence
of the fifth amendment privilege, is, as far as the actual blood test
is concerned, irrelevant and probably does not apply.63
ation by the Court in Miranda, which said: "By custodial interroga-
tion, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
If the blood test had been held to come under the fifth amendment
privilege, petitioner's right to counsel would assuredly arise before the
test was taken.
62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
63 For a different conclusion to this particular problem see, Ruffin, Intox-
ication Tests and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 2 CALIF. WEST. L. REV.
1 (1966).
CASENOTE
In reading and analyzing Schmerber one should not overlook
two passages. The first is that of Justice Clark writing the opinion
for the Court in Breithaupt v. Abram, where he states:
Modern community living requires modern scientific methods
of crime detection lest the public go unprotected. The increasing
slaughter on the highways, most of which should be avoidable,
now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battle-
field.... As against the right of the individual that his person
be held inviolable ... must be set the interests of society in the
scientific determination of intoxication, one of the great causes
of the mortal hazards of the road.6 4
The second is from Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Chil-
dren of Darkness: "[A]ny definition of a proper balance between
freedom and order must always be at least slightly colored by the
exigencies of the moment which may make the peril of the one
seem greater and the security of the other therefore preferable."65
Kevin P. Colleran, '68
64 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
65 NIEBURR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AN THE CHILDREN OF DARKNEss, 78
(Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944).
